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137 C.2d 683; 234 P.2d 9721

fL. A. No. 21701. In Bank. Aug. 24. 1951.]

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant, v. J. A. McCLURKEN
et aI., Respondents.
[1] Zoning - Existing Nonconforming Uses. - The utilization of

J

four new gasoline storage tanks increasing storage tank capacity more than five times is not a mere continuance of an
existing nonconforming use which, when exempted by a zoning
ordinance, consisted of the intermittent storage of lumber and
Bcrap metal, preliminary grading, steel beam storage and the
use of movable gasoline storage tanks.
[2] Id.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-Even if new gasoline storage tanks are utilized for an original nonconforming
industrial use exempted by a zoning ordinance, they constitute
an unwarranted enlargement of such nonconforming use consisting of the intermittent storage of lumber and scrap metnl,
preliminary grading, steel beam storage and use of movable
gasoline storage tanks, where the new storage cnpacity is more
than five times the old, the tanks are double the size of the
largest original and are permanently affixed in a residential
zone.
[S] Id. - New Nonconforming Use. - The utilization of gasoline
storage tanks as an incident to a service station erected after
adoption of a zoning ordinance is not merely the expM.sion
of a previously existing nonconforming use, consisting of the
utilization of smaller movable storage tanks for supplying
power incident to industrial use, but is a new use.
[t) Id.-Oontinuance of Nonconforming Use.-The continuance of
a nonconforming use permitted by a zoning ordinance is a
continuance of the same use.
[6] Id.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-It would be an unwarranted discrimination in favor of certain property owners
to permit them, by enlarging their permitted nonconforming
use, to construct gasoline storage tanks in a residential zone
in which they are prohibited.
[6] Id. - Structural Alterations. - Construction of new storage
tanks in a residential zone is prohibited by an ordinance forbidding structural alterations of a building used for a permitted
nonconforming use, since surb tnnks are buildings within the
ordinance and a prohibition of structural alterations, although
not precluding routine repair and maintenance, does preclude
erection of D{,W buildings.

[1] See 12 Oal.Jur. lO-Yr. Supp. 160: 58 Am.Jur. 1021.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-12J Zoning.
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[7] Id.-Comprehensive Zoning.-The purpose of a purchase! of
real property must yield to the public interest in the enforcement of a comprehensive zoning plan.
[8] Id.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-A real property
purchaser's intention to expand his business on the property
does not give him the right to expand a nonconforming use permitted by a zoning ordinance.
[9] Id.-Persons Bound by Zoning ltegulations.-An owner who
has Jegally undertaken construction of a building before the
efiective date of a zoning ordinance may complete the building
and use it for the purpose designed after the effective date of
the ordinance.
[10] Id.-E1fect of Ordinance on Existing PermitB.-A permittee
who has expended substantial sums under a permit cannot be
deprived by a subsequent zoning ordinance of the right to complete construction and to use the premises as authorized by the
permit.
[11] Id.-Variances.-The fact that variances may have been
granted to some owners and denied to others does not establish
unreasonable discrimination.
[12] Id.-Variances.-The granting or denial of variances rests
largely in the discretion of the body designated by the zoning
ordinance for that purpose, and a denial of a variance will not
be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of
discretion.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court. of San
Diego County. C. M. Monroe, Judge. Reversed.
Action to compel removal of gasoline storage tanks. Judgment for defendants re.-ersed.
James Don Keller, District Attorney, Bertram McLees, Jr.,
and Duane J. Carnes, Deputy District Attorneys, for Appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles) and
Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Bertrand L. Comparet for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-The county of San Diego brought this
action to compel the removal of four gasoline storage tanks
allegedly erected in violation of a county zoning ordinance.
Judgment was entered for defendants, and the county appeals.
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Defendants' property is about a mile from the center of
Lemon Grove, a suburban area whose cent.er is approximately
8 miles northeast of the business center of the city of San
Diego. At the time of the filing of this action this area was
predominantly residential with some local business and industry centered around the intersection of Broadway, the principal east-west arterial. and Imperial Boulevard, the principal
north-south arterial. Business establishments were located
east and west from this intersection along both sides of Broadway anil were spottily distributed elsewhere throughout the
area. Defendants' land is on the southwest corner of the
intersection of Broadway and Massachusetts Avenue, northsouth arterial approximately one mile from Imperial Boulevard. The land is rectangular in shape and extends 660 feet
south from Broadway and 1,760 feet west from Massachusetts
Avenue.
The trial court found that continuously since 1938 defendants have used their property, with the exception of a small
part not material to this action, for beavy industrial purposes,
including above-ground storage of gasoline and other fuels,
storage of paint for industrial painting, wbolesale storage
and sale of lumber, storage of steel beams and parts of machinery for beavy manufacturing, storage of rock, sand, and
gravel, storage of junk and old iron, manufacture of acetylene
gas and metal bearings, automobile and truck wrecking, building and rebuilding of beavy machinery, boiler repair shop,
commercial planing mill, sandblasting, welding, heavy manufacturing processes using up to 2000 horsepower in the operation of machines, and general heavy construction contracting
business. The court also found that defendants have used the
entire premises as a unit in carrying out such uses, and that
the part of defendants' land wbere the tanks in question are·
situated bas been used for tbe foregoing industrial purposes.
·Wben defendants undertook tbis use of their land, the neighboring area was nearly all undeveloped, with virtually no
residences.
In 1942 the county adopted Ordinance No. 268 (New Series)
as part of a comprehensive zoning plan for the Lemon Grove
area. This ordinance divided defendants' property into three
districts. A retail business district, C-1, included the area
extending south for 150 feet from the south property line
on Broadway, thence from Massachusetts to tbe west edge
of defendants' land; a whoh>sale business section, C-2, included approximately the west two thirds of defendants' land,
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running south from tilE> C-l zone for an additional 330 feE't;
and a residential district, R-2-A, extending sonth from the
C-l ZOlJ(', which included onE' third of defendants' land.
In 1948 defendants erected a retail gasoline station near
the intl'rsectioll of Broadway and Mllssachusetts A venue. The
service station was within the area zoned for retail business,
which permitted that use. Defendants also E'rected four tanks
to provide storage facilities for the service station. Although
the tanks are near the service station, they extend approximately 50 feet within the area zoned for residences. Before
1942 steel beams and trusses had been stored on this corner
and there was a preliminary leveling of the land and a service
road made thereon. There is no disagreement among any of
the witnesses, however, that until the tanks in question werE'
erected there were !lu permanent structures of any kind on
this corner before or after 1942.
The trial court concluded that the tanks were permitted
under a provision of the ordinance exempting nonconforming
uses existing at the time of its adoption.
Section 17 of Ordinance 371, incorporated by reference in
Ordinance 268 (New Series) provides:
"'l'he lawful use of land existing at the time of the passage
of this ordinance, although such use does not conform to the
provisions hereof, may be continued; if such nonconforming
use is discontinued any future use of said land shall be in
conformity with the provisions of this ordinance. "
Such a provision is ordinarily included in zoning ordinances because of the hardship and doubtful constitutionality
of compelling the immediate discontinuance of nonconforming
uses. (See Jones v. Oity of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304 [295
P.14].) "The object of such a provision is the gradual elimination of the nonconforming use by obsolescence or destruction by firl' or the elements, and it has been frequently upheld
by the courts." (Rehfeld v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 84
[21 P .2d 4Hl].) There is a growing tendency to guard against
the indrfillite continuance of nonconforming uses by providing
for their liquidation within a prescribed period.
(See 35
Va.L.Rev. 348, 356; Standard Oil 00. v. Oity of Tallahassee,
1~3 F.2d 410, 413, cert. den., 340 U.S. 892 [71 S.Ct. 208,
l)j L.Ed. 647] ; State ex rd. Derlla Realty 00. v. McDonald,
168 La. 17~ [121 So. 613], cert. den. 280 n.s. 556 [50 S.Ct.
Hi, ;4 L.Eel. 612} ; Stafe ex rel. Dema Realty 00. v. Jacoby,
168 La. 752 1123 So. 314].)
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Given the objective of zoning to eliminate nonconforming
uses, courts throughout the country generally follow a strict
policy against their extension or enlargcment. 1
[1] The evidence most favorable to defendants is that in
their nonconforming use they utilized fuel tanks that were
moved on heavy skid timbers from place to place as they
were needed. One tank had a capacity of 1,200 gallons, another 2,300 gallons, and the largest a capacity of 6,000 gallons.
Now, however, they have four new tanks with a capacity of
12,000 gallons each, that are 32 feet high and 8 feet in
diameter and are permanently located upon a rectangular
concrete base 10 feet wide and 54 feet long. In erecting
four new tanks double the size of the largest of the old,
defendants have not only increased their fuel storage capacity
more than five times but have permanently affixed the tanks
within the area zoned for residences. Such a formidable expansion can hardly be viewed as a mere continuance of the
nonconforming use consisting of the intermittent storage of
'Rehfeld v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 85 [21 P.2d 419); Burke v.
City of LOB .dngeles, 68 Cal.App.2d 189, 191 [156 P.2d 28); Yuba City v.
Cherniavsky, 117 Cal.App. 568, 573 [4 P.2d 299); Wilson v. Edgar, 64
Cal.App. 654, 657 [222 P. 623); De Felice v. East Ha'l:en, 130 Conn. 156
[32 A.2d 635, 147 A.L.R. 161); Piccolo v. West Hat:en, 120 Conn. 449
\181 A. 615, 617]; Thayer v. Board of .dppeals, 114 Conn. 15 [157 A.
273, 276); Ware v. Wichita, 118 Kan. 265 [234 P. 978); Goodrich v.
Selligman, 298 Ky. 863 [183 S.W.2d 625, 627). Dorman v. Baltimore,
187 Md. 678 [51 A.2d 658, 661); Colati v. Jirollt, 186 Md. 652 [47 A.2d
613, 615·616); Beyer v. Mayol and City of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444
[34 A.2d 765, 769); Connors v. Town of Burlington (1950), Mass.
[91 N.E.2d 212, 213]; Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy, 320
Mass. 207 [68 N.E.2d 918, 919); Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass.
216 [61 N.E.2d 243, 247, 168 A.L.R. 1181); Town of Marblehead v.
Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124 [55 N.E.2d 13); Town of Lexington v. Bean,
272 Mass. 547 [172 N.E. 867, 870]; Cole v. City of Battle Creek, 298
Mich. 98 [298 N.W. 466,468]; .dustin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667 [278 N.W.
727, 729); Women's Christian .dss'n. of Kansas City v. Brown, 354
Mo. 700 [190 S.W.2d 900, 906); In re Botz, 236 Mo.App. 566 [159
S.W.2d 367, 371·373]; Lynch v. Borough of Hillsdale, 136 N.J.L. 129
[54 A.2d 723, 725·726}; Albright v. Johnson. 135 N.J.L. 70 [50 A.2d
399); Bllrmore Co. v. Smith, 124 N.J.L. 541 f12 A.2d 353, 856}; Home
Fuel Oil Co. v. Glen Rock, 118 N.J.L. 340 [192 A. 516, 518}; De Vito v.
Pearsall, 115 N.J.L. 323 [180 A. 202]; Conaway v. .dtlantic City, 107
N.J.L. 404 [154 A. 6); Pillage of OS8ining v. Meredith, 73 N.Y.S.2d
897; People v. Giorgi, 16 N.Y.S.2d 923; Pisicc11io v. Board of .dppeals,
165 Misc. 156 [300 N.Y.S. 368, 369]; State ex reI. City Ice ~ Fuel Co. v.
Stegner, 120 Ohio St. 418 [166 N.E. 226. 227, 64 A.L.R. 916]; Appeal
of Kiddy, 294 Pa. 209 [143 A. 909); .dppcal of Yocom, 142 Pa. Super.
165 [1f> A.~d 687, 689·690]; Meserolo v. Board of .ddjustment, City of
Dal1a..~, (Tex. Ch·. App.) 172 S.W.2d 528, f>30·531; Benjamin v. Lietzt
--l'tab-- f211 P.2d 449, 4511; sce 147 A.L.R. 167; 8 McQuillin,
Municipal Corpomtions, 3d ed. 1950, § 25.183, pp. 366·367.
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lumber and scrap metal, preliminary grading, steel beam storage, or even the use of movable tanks •• all over the property,
first one spot and then another" that may have occurred in
tbe area in question. [2] Even if the new tanks were used to
supply power for the original industrial use, they would constitute an unwarranted enlargement of that nonconforming
use. (See Rehfeld v. San Francisco; Yuba Oity v. Oherniavsky; Piccolo v. West Haven; De Felice v. East Haven; Thaye,.
v. Board of Appeals; Ware v. Wichita; Oolati v. Jirout; Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy; Town of Marblehead v. Rosenthal; Town of Burlington v. Dunn; Austin v.
Olde.r; Women's Ohnstian Ass'n. of Kansas City v. Brown;
In re Botz; Home Fuel Oil 00. v. Glen Rock; DeVito v. Pearsall; Pisicchio v. Board of Appeals; People v. Giorgi; State
ex. ,.el. Oity Ice & Fuel 00. v. Stegne,.; Appeal of Yocom;
supra note 1.)
[3] The new tanks involve not merely an expansion of
a nonconforming use but a new nonconforming use. The
permitted use was for the storage of fuels to be consumed
in supplying power as an incident to the industrial use; the
new tanks are used as an incident to the service station use.
[4] The continuance of a nonconforming use "is a continuance of the same use and not some other kind of use." (Kensington Realty Holding Oorp. v. Jersey Oity, 118 N.J.L. 114
[191 A. 787, 788] ; Simone v. Peters, 135 N.J.L. 495 [53 A.2d
315] ; Home Fuel Oil 00. v. Glen Rock; Town of Lexington v.
Bean; In re Botz; Women's Ohristian Ass'n. of Kansas Oity
v. Brown; Appeal of Yocom; supra, note 1.) Defendants
never conducted a service station on their premises until 1948,
six years after the adoption of the ordinance. Although the
service station is permitted in its location, the tanks are not
permitted in the residence zone where defendants erected
them. [5] No one may erect such tanks in this residential
district, and it would be an unwarranted discrimination in
favor of defendants to hold that they may do so· (Rehfeld v.
San Francisco, supra, 218 Cal. 83, 85; Pisicchio v. Boa,.d of
Appeals, 165 Misc. 156 [300 N.Y.S. 368,369-370].)
[6] Even if it be assumed that the tanks did not involve
a new nonconforming use of the land, their construction was
prohibited by the second paragraph of section 17 of Ordinance
371, which provides:
"The lawful use of a building existing at the time of the
passage of this ordinance may be continued, although such
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use does n()t conform with the proyisions hereof; suet! use
may be extended throughout the building provided no structural alterations, except those required by law or ordinance,
are made therein. If no structural alterations are made, a
non-conforming use of a building may be changed to another
non-conforming use of the same or more restricted classifications. "
A "building" is defined in section 1 of ordinance 371 as
.. a structure having a roof supported by columns or walls."
c, Structure" is defined as C Canything constructed or erected
and use of which requires more or less permanent location on
the ground or attachment to somethiug having a permanent
location on the ground." It has been held that "building"
includes a water tank (State v. Ornelas, 42 N.M. 17 [74 P.2d
723, 725]) ; a dugout or artificial cave (State v. Clark, 221
Mo.App. 893 [288 S.W. 77]); a silo (Bush v. Norman
(Mo.App.) 199 S.W. 721); a 35-foot steel tower and 60-barrel
steel storage tank supported thereby (Griffin v. Holland, 191
Okla. 417 [131 P.2d 113]) ; an iron fence (Swasey v. County
of Shasta, 141 Cal. 392, 394 [74 P. 1031]); a sand-hopper
(Wilbttr v. City of Newton, 302 Mass. 38 [18 N.E.2d 365, 368] ;
a billboard (Goodrich v. Selligman, supra, note 1; for numerous other illustrations see 12 C.J .S. 382.) Thus, there can be no
doubt that the four new tanks are "buildings" within the
meaning of the ordinance. Although the prohibition of structural alterations does not preclude ordinary routine repair
and maintenance of existing buildings (see 58 Am.Jur. Zoning, § 156, p. 1026) it does preclude the erection of new buildings. If an old building cannot be enlarged, a fortiori a new
building cannot be built. (RehfeZd v. San Francisco; Yuba
City v. Cherniavsky; Piccolo v. West Haven; Goodrich v.
Selligman; Colati v. Jirout; Connors v. Town of Burlington;
Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy; Cole v. Battle
Creek; Women's Christian Ass'n. of Kansas City v. Brown;
DeVito v. Pearsall; Benjamin v. Lietll; supra, note 1; see 8
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed. 1950, § 25. 205,
p.893.)
Defendants contend that they would have constructed all
necessary facilities at the beginning to complete the full industrial development of their property had they had capital
enough and that since they "had to finish the plant as they
could earn it, one building at a time," they gained a vested
. right to continue the development of their land until its full

)
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industrial use had been reached. [7] The purpose of 'th;0
landowner in purchasing the property must yield to the pu~
lie interest in the enforcement of a comprehensive zoning ;
plan. (Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Ca1.2d 332,
337 [171 P.2d 542]; Acker v. Ba.ldwin, 18 Ca1.2d 341, 344
[115 P.2d 455] ; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena,
1 Ca1.2d 87, 93-94 [33 P.2d 672] ; cf. Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale, 14 Ca1.2d 213, 215 [93 P.2d 93].) [8] The intention to
expand the business in the future does not give defendants
the right to expand a nonconforming use. (Town of Billerico Y.
. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687 [71 N.E.2d 236, 236] ; Chayt v. Board
of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City, 17 Md. 426 [9 A.2d 747,
750] ; Appeal of Kiddy, supra, note 1.) The ordinance hal,
made allowance for the continuance of nonconforming uses
existent in 1942; it does not permit the enlargement of such
uses as the owners find expansion desirable. It is immaterial
that a property owner in an area zoned for residential purposes contemplated the maximum commercial utilization of
his property previous to the zoning ordinance. (Sumny Slope
Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Ca1.2d 87, 95 [33 P.2d 672] ;
O'Rourke v. '['eeters, 63 Cal.App.2d 349, 352 [146 P.2d 983];
Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 36 F.2d 242,
244; 47 F.2d 528, 534, cert. den. 284 U.S. 634 [52 8.Ot. 18,
76 L.Ed. 540] ; Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153 [214
P. 99] ; Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63
[145 N.E. 265] ; Chayt v, Board of Zoning Appeals of Balti-:
more City, supra.) Although defendants are confined in their
nonconforming use to the acth'ities carried on at the time ~
their property was zoned, they enjoy a favored position com~i:
pared to those who purchased property for a nonconforming .j
use and were prevented from using it at all for that purpose
because their property was zoned before they could establish ~
such a use.
Defendants rely on In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368 [77 P. 180J
and Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 224 [25 8.Ct. 18,
49 L.Ed. 169]. In the Smith ease the gas works had been
erected before the passage of the ordinance. It exemplifies
the rule that a lawful use existing at the time a zoning ordi-·
nance becomes effective cannot be prohibited when it is not a
public nuisance. In the Dobbins ease the owner undertook
construction of a gas works in a permitted area and expended
some $2,500 in erecting thr fonndatioIl before a zoning ordinance was passed prohibiting gas works in that district.
'1'
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[9] If aYl owner has legally undertaken the construction of
a building before the effective date of a zoning ordinance, he
may complete the building and use it for the purpose designed
after the effective date of the ordinance. (City of Coldwater v.
Will1'ams Oil Co., 288 Mich. 140 [284 N.W. 675] j Best & Co. v.
Incorporated Village of Garden City, 286 N.Y.S. 980, aff'd.
273 N.Y. 564 [7 N.E.2d 694].) Protection of an undertaking
involving the investment of capital, the purchase of equipment, and the employment of workers, is akin to protection
of a nonconforming use existing at the time that zoning restrictions become effective. [10] The same principle underlies the rule that a permittee who has expended substantial
15l1mS under a permit cannot be deprived by a subsequent
zoning ordinance of the right to complete construction and
to use the premises as authorized by the permit. (TransOceanic Oil Gorp. v. Santa Barbara, 85 Cal.App.2d 776 [194
P.2d 148] j Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich.
372 [228 N.W. 707] j Atlantic Broadcasting Co. v. Wayne
Tp., 109 N.J.L. 442 [162 A. 631] ; Nassau-Fulton Realty Corp.
v. Schlimm, 67 N.Y.S.2d 501 j People v. Bales, 224 App.Div.
87 [229 N.Y.S. 550].)
Defendants contend that they are being discriminated
against on the ground that neighboring owners were granted
variances and that over half the lands within a radius of the
intersection of Broadway and Massachusetts Avenue were
being used for heavy industrial purposes. There was a sharp
conflict in the evidence as to the extent and nature of the
other nonconforming uses in this area. The trial court made
no finding on this issue, and the evidence does not establish
unjust discrimination as a matter of law. No zonng ordinance
can classify districts with perfect justice. Since cases of
unusual hardship may require variances, zoning authorities
are usually given power to grant them. [11] The fact that
variances may have been granted to some owners and denied
to others, however, does not establish unreasonable discrimination. [12] The granting or denial of variances rests
largely in the discretion of the body designated by the zoning
ordinance for that purpose, and a denial of a variance will not
be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of
discretion. (Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 Cal.2d 119 [104
P.2d 1041] ; Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.App.2d 605,
613 [126 P.2d 954) ; Larkin Co., Inc. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330,
336 [151 N.E. 637, 6391. A~ to the degree of discretion
vested in such bodies, see Lockard v. Los ..Angeles, 33 Ca1.2d

)
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453,461 [202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990] ; Acker v. Baldwin, Ii
Ca1.2d 341, 344 [115 P.2d 455].)
Judgment reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. The factual issues in this case,
upon substantially conflicting evidence, were resolved adversely to the plaintiff by the trial court. Instead of viewing the
case favorably to sustaining the judgment on contested issues
of fact, the majority apply a directly contrary view. It is
further my view that the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, prepared by Presiding Justice Barnard, with Justice Griffin concurring (reported in
99 A.C.A. 957 [222 P.2d 688]), correctly and soundly disposes
of the issues presented.
For the reasons stated I would affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Shenk, J., concurred.
vARTER, J .-1 dissent.
The majority opinion overrides the findings of the trial
court based on conflicting evidence and thus arrives at the
conclusion that defendants were not continuing the nonconforming use of their property after the passage of the zoning
ordinance.
The trial court found that in 1938, before any zoning ordinance was applicable to defendants' property they used it "for
heavy industrial purposes, including, among others, the following: automobile and motor-truck wrecking and rebuilding;
heavy machinery wrecking and rebuilding; boiler shops;
gasoline and oil storage, above ground; junk yards; lumber
storage and wood-working, such storage being carried on in
the open and without enclosure by walls; the manufacture,
storage and use of acetylene gas; sandblasting; both gas ILD.d
electric welding; storage of explosives; storage, and use in
manufacturing processes, of paints, oil and shellac; the operation of a planing mill; storage of rock, sand and gravel;
storage of old iron in large quantities ; operation of large machine shops, using heavy machinery; storage and repair of
heavy construction machinery; sale of machinery of various
kinds. That said Defendants have made use of all of the land
so owned by them . . . as a unit, to be used in its entirety for
the convenient and efficient operation thereon of the said heavy
industrial purposes and uses." (Italics added.) It was ape-

)
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cifically found, with reference to the four storage tanks here
involved, that: "the portion of said Defendants' said land
upon which said tanks for the storage of gasoline and other
fuels were erected and are now situated is within the portion
of said lands which said Defendants have, continuously since
the year 1938, used for heavy industrial purposes, as aforesaid." (Italics added.)
The evidence adequately supports those findings, establishing that prior to 1942, and before the enactment of the zoning
ordinance, defendants conducted an extensive industrial business on all their property, manufacturing heavy machinery,
constructing heavy equipment, storing, selling and using explosives, gasoline, butane, lumber, machinery, etc. For illustration, J. A. McClurken, one of the defendants, testified:
"Q. Now, in this matter of the storage of fuel and lumber
and paint and explosives and so on, was that restricted strictly
to any o~e particular portion of the premises' A. I twas
spread over the entire property. That is what the property
was purchased for and that is what it was used for constantly
from that day till this . . . . Q. Now, with regard to the fuel
storage there for the use of gasoline or Diesel or butane operated engines, during what portion of the time did you have an
above-ground fuel storage' Was that prior to 1942' A. Oh,
yes, we have always had our fuel above ground. . . . Q. When
you say tanks off of trucks do you mean the little 15 or 20
gallon tanks that the trucks, in the engine, gets its fuel from f
A. No, we have one tank that holds 1200 gallons j another one
that holds 2300 gallons; another one I think holds 6000 gallons. They have not aU been full, as a rule, at one time,
but we have used them according to the volume of work and
according to the needs of the equipment, or according to our
gasoline usage. Sometimes they would all be full; sometimes
one of them would be full, and it would vary according to
the actual gallonage that we were using. . . . Q. Now, what
part of the premises did you have above-ground fuel storage
on' Was it limited permanently and definitely to just one
tank, or where' A. Oh, no, we had it all over the property;
first one spot and then another; wherever it was most convenient to have it." With reference to any change in the
use of the property he said: "Q. Now, getting back to the
various types of manufacturing and storage work conducted
on your premises, has there been an(y) substantial change in
the nature of the use of your premises from what it was before
1942, as you have described it, down to the present time'
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Have you changed your use! A. No, sir, OU1' operations are
identical." (Italics added.) In other words, defendants were
engaged in a highly diversified business which embraced selling, manufacturing, storing and repairing II wide variety of
things, and to conduct that business, maintail1f'd all sorts of
equipment, huge buildings and tanks. That business is the
same now as it was prior to 1942. The trial court, taking all
of these factors into consideration, concluded that the use of
the gasoline tanks here involved did not constitute a substantial change in the use of the property. Certainly that cannot
be said to be an unreasonable conclusion, yet the majority
states that it is. By a picayunish selection of trivialities, it
asserts there was a change of use because the tanks are larger
than those used formerly and that the· fuels stored are to be
used for sale instead of defendants' use in manufacturing.
There is evidence that fuel was sold before 1942, but, in any
event, the change is not substantial considering the extensive
and diversified character of defendants' operations. The ordinance exempts uses existing at the time of its passage. Here
the evidence shows that t.he use of defendants' property is the
same. They are still operating the same business as before
the adoption of the ordinance.
There is no sound basis for distinction between this case and
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 [25 S.Ct. 18, 49 L.Ed.
169], where the court held invalid an ordinance barring gas
works where the property owner had partially erected the
plant when the ordinance was passed. The court there said
(p. 239) : "Being the owner of the land and having partially .
erected the work" the plaintiff in error had acquired property ..
rights and was e~titled to protection against unconstitutional
encroachments which would have the effect to deprive her
of her property without due process of law."· If the right to
complete a partially built structure is protected, certainly
there is a constitutionally protected right to continue to
operate the business exactly the same as before (as the evidence shows). Fuel storage tanks were previously maintained
on the property. There is no more reason for preventing their
enlargement than there would be for stopping the completion
of a gas plant. In fact, this is a stronger case, for here the
industrial business operations are being continued. The true
test has been stated: "The faet that improved or more efficient instrumentalities are utilized in pursuit of the use does
not exclude it from the category of an 'existing use' within
a town zoning ordinance permitting the continuanee of non- ..
conforming existing uses, provided the instrumentalities are
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ordinarily and reasonably adapted to make the use available
to the owner and the original nature and purpose of tke
undertaking remain unchanged. . . . It is a definitely settled
proposition of law that the 'continuance of a non-conforming
use' existing at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance is a continuance of the same use and not some other
kind of use. In determining whether anon-conforming use
was the same before and after passage of a zoning ordinance,
so as to be permissible, each ease must stand on its own facts .
. . . In a recent New York case where a lot in an area zoned
for residential purposes was subject to anon-conforming use
of storage of poles, cable and ¢pe, the non-conforming use
related to storage and the storage of any other object was a
valid continuation of such non-conforming use unless the
thing stored was vastly different and in itself created new
problems, in which case it could be considered a change of
use." (Emphasis added.) (Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice,
p. 254.) (See, also, Royal Baking Co. v. Oklahoma City, 182
Okla. 45 [75 P.2d 1105] ; Borough of Cheswick v. Beckman,
352 Pa. 79 [42 A.2d 60] ; President ct Trustees of Ossining
v. Meredith, 73 N.Y.S.2d 897; McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co.,
76 Cal.App.2d 247 [172 P.2d 758].)
Reference is made to the portion of the ordinance prohibiting structural changes in preexisting buildings. Plainly, that
provision deals with the change in use of the property which
would follow from a structural alteration, that is, for example,
if a residence was sO changed that it could be used as a factory.
The essential factor is still the nature of the use of the property. Has that been so altered or extended that the exemption
for nonconforming uses does not apply T If not, as is the case
here, there is no violation of the zoning law.
Finally, it is said that the evidence is highly conflicting
on whether the ordinance discriminates against defendants,
but that there is no finding on the subject, and, therefore,
defendants cannot prevail. There is ample evidence that the
immediate neighborhood around defendants' property is
thickly sprinkled with heavy industry and businesses such as
the storage and sale of fuel. '!'he findings must be liberally
construed to support the judgment. So construed, there is a
sufficient finding on the subject. Defendants, in their answer,
denied tht they had violated the ordinance and that the
ordinance applied to their property. That denial was found
to be true. They alleged that their use was" in lteeping with
permits" granted by the county. That was found to be true.
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It may be at least implied from such findings that the ordinance unlawfully discriminates against them, and the judgment might well be upheld on this ground. However, there
is no need of even considering the question of discrimination
in the enforcement of the ordinance, as the evidence overwhelmingly supports the finding that defendants' so-called
nonconforming uses are a mere continuation of the uses to
which their property had been devoted before the adoption of
the ordinance and are therefore exempted by its provisions.
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the opinion
prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Barnard of the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, which affirmed the
judgment in this case. (See 99 A.C.A. 957 [222 P.2d 688].)
I would therefore affirm the judgment.

